olitics is, at its core, a process of forming and expressing preferen When democratic citizens vote to elect representatives or terrorists detonate bombs to demand a voice in government policy making or insurgents attempt to overthrow a dictatorship, these political actors have opinions about what they consider to be good or bad and are expressing those attitudes through significant and consequential actions. Thus, to fully understand the workings of politics, we must understand how political actors form the attitudes that direct their conduct.
During this century, numerous scholars have explored the origins of political attitude formation in one particular domain: democratic elections.
And in fact, most scholars of voting have shared a vision of the process by which citizens derive their evaluations of candidates. Whether manifested explicitly in discussions of information processing (e.g., Kelley 1983; Kelley and Mirer 1974) or implicitly in hundreds of linear regression equations estimated over the years (for a review, see Kinder 1998), we have presumed Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) to party affiliations and stands on policy issues (Campbell et al. 1960) , perceptions of candidates' personalities and the emotional responses they evoke (Abelson et al. 1982) , retrospective assessments of the nation's economy and international status (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979) , prospective judgments of candidates' likely performance (Fiorina 1981) , and much more (e.g., Kinder and Sears 1985; Miller and Shanks 1996) .
The last ten years, however, have seen a number of challenges to conventional wisdom about voter decision making. For example, Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) challenged the presumption that voters canvass their considerations on election day with the notion that overall candidate evaluations are built on-line, updated regularly throughout campaigns. Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989; Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995) challenged the widely popular spatial model of policy voting (e.g., Enelow and Hinich 1984) with a directional model (see also Westholm 1997) . And Gelman and King (1993) We offer yet another challenge to conventional wisdom by reconsidering the simple model of information combination that voting researchers have so widely taken for granted. A great deal of research in psychology suggests that amendments should be made to this model, and we offer these amendments in the form of what we call the asymmetric nonlinear model (ANM) of attitude formation (see Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Cacioppo and Gardner 1993; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1997) . We begin below by outlining traditionally used models of attitude formation in the voting literature and explaining how the ANM differs from them. We then report survey evidence pitting traditional models against the ANM in attempts to describe the origins of attitudes toward candidates and political parties. As we shall see, the ANM outperforms the traditional models quite consistently, a conclusion that has interesting and important implications for understanding the conduct of politics.
Furthermore, we will see that the ANM allows detection of a new psychological determinant of voter turnout that the SLM does not.
Two Models of Attitude Formation
The most popular model of candidate evaluation might best be called the symmetric linear model (SLM), stated most explicitly twenty-five years ago by Kelley and Mirer (1974) . They proposed that people form an attitude toward a candidate by subtracting the number of unfavorable beliefs they have about him or her from the number of favorable beliefs they have. This model can be represented as follows:
A=oc(F-U)+I (1) where A is a person's attit number of favorable beliefs the person has about the candidate, U is the number of unfavorable beliefs the person has about the candidate, and ?cx is the impact of each favorable or unfavorable belief. I is the intercept: the attitude of a person with no favorable or unfavorable beliefs.
According to the SLM, cc1 should be positive, and I should be the neutral point on the dependent variable (i.e., people with no favorable beliefs and no unfavorable beliefs are posited by this model to have neutral attitudes).
Linear multiple regression equations likewise presume that considerations are added together to yield overall attitudes. These models have been different from Kelley and Mirer's in two important ways, though. First, most models have permitted some categories of considerations to be weighted more heavily than others. And second, these models typically do not simply count considerations but rather treat them each as continuous variables. Nonetheless, the basic spirit of these equations is the same as Kelley and Mirer's (1974) .
However, work in psychology adopting a behavioral adaptive perspective suggests a number of amendments to these sorts of simple models (Peeters 1971; Peeters and Czipanski 1990) . According to this literature, human cognitive and behavioral processes developed because they facilitate survival and reproduction in a potentially hostile world. Stated most bluntly, if people are to survive, they must acquire food and avoid predators. So approaching any new and unfamiliar object with favorable expectations is worthwhile, because it could be food or could facilitate acquisition of food. However, one must vigilantly scan for any signs of danger an object might pose, so that one can extricate oneself from potentially lethal situations. When one's favorable expectations about an object are violated, one must be especially sensitive and react promptly, before it is too late to avoid potential danger.
Approaching novel objects and avoiding potential threats once enhanced the survival of our ancestors, and these aspects of the evaluative system are likely to be observable in people today (see also Marcus and MacKuen 1993) . In the absence of any information about an object, then, attitudes toward it should be slightly positive. And people should be especially attentive to the first information they receive about the object, in order to form an ac- According to the ANM, the coefficient oxl is presumed to be positive, such that favorable information increases the positivity of attitudes, whereas ?C2 is presumed to be negative, because unfavorable information presumably decreases the positivity of attitudes. The exponents m and n are expected to be less than one, reflecting the decelerating impact of additional pieces of information.
The tendency to feel slightly positive in the absence of information, called the positivity offset, should be expressed by a value of I slightly on the positive side of neutral. The tendency for unfavorable information to have greater impact than favorable information, called the negativity bias, may be expressed in two ways. First, the absolute value of CC2 may be greater than that of cc,, representing hypersensitivity to initial unfavorable information. Second, the value of n may be larger than the value of m, demonstrating slower deceleration of the marginal utility of unfavorable information than of favorable information (see Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1999) .
Separate lines of research in psychology attest to the validity of each of these three elements of the ANM. For example, when people are asked to evaluate an unknown, hypothetical person, they tend to be slightly favorable (Adams-Weber 1979; Benjafield 1985) . Numerous psychological studies of impression formation have shown that unfavorable information has more impact than favorable information (e.g., Fiske 1980; Gardner and Cacioppo 1996; Ronis and Lipinski 1985; Van der Pligt and Eiser 1980; Vonk 1993 Vonk , 1996 . And numerous impression formation studies have shown that impressions are more powerfully shaped by initial information (e.g., Anderson 1965a Anderson , 1967 Anderson , 1973 Belmore 1987; Hendrick et al. 1973) .1 Furthermore, integrated tests of these elements have yielded strong support for them in describing the origins of attitudes toward a range of different objects (e.g., Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1997; Gardner and Cacioppo 1996) .
Implications for Understanding Elections
Although the differences between the SLM and the ANM may seem small, these differences have a number of important implications for understanding the unfolding of campaigns. First, the SLM and the ANM make different predictions about the relative impact of favorable and unfavorable information. If the SLM is correct, favorable and unfavorable information about a candidate have equivalent impact on attitudes toward him or her. Thus, a candidate would benefit equally from presenting a piece of favorable information about himself or herself or presenting a piece of unfavorable information about his or her opponent. In contrast, the ANM posits that unfavorable information will have greater impact than will favorable information, suggesting an advantage to presenting unfavorable information about one's opponent, rather than presenting favorable information about oneself. Thus, the occurrence of an event during a campaign that advantages one candidate and disadvantages the other is likely to have more impact on the latter rather than the former. ' Recency effects have been found in some studies (e.g., Lichtenstein and Srull 1987; Richter and Kruglanski 1998) when people acquired information about an object without having the goal of forming an impression of the object (e.g., Lichtenstein and Srull 1987; Richter and Kruglanski 1998) . Because people most likely form impressions of political candidates as they acquire information about them, such recency effects seem unlikely in the context of elections.
contrast, the ANM suggests that the first piece of information about a candidate produces greater change in attitudes toward him or her than all subsequent information. Thus, the ANM suggests that any given message about a candidate will lead to the greatest attitude change among people who know the least about the candidate.
Finally, the SLM and ANM predict different attitudes toward candidates among people who have no information about a candidate. The SLM suggests that such people will be neutral toward the candidate, but the ANM suggests that these people will have slightly positive attitudes. And as we will see, whether voters are neutral or slightly positive toward a candidate has significant impact on whether they will turn out to vote in the election. Thus, the differences between the SLM and the ANM have important implications for understanding how campaigns affect voters' attitudes toward candidates, for understanding which campaign strategies are most effective in altering election outcomes, and for understating the dynamics of turnout.
Study Overview
In doing the research described below, we set out to test the assertion that the ANM describes the processes by which citizens evaluate political candidates and political parties. Using survey data on U.S. presidential elections collected during a twenty-four-year period, we compared the fit of the SLM and the ANM, examining cross-sectional associations between beliefs about and attitudes toward Presidential candidates and political parties, generality across various subgroups of the electorate differing in political involvement, the causal influence of beliefs on attitudes, and the impact of attitudes toward candidates on turnout.
In order to optimally test the ANM and the SLM, one could track changes in favorable and unfavorable belief learning over the course of a campaign, as well as changes in attitudes toward the candidates. As people acquire beliefs, a researcher could, in principle, assess the impact of each belief after a new one is acquired. This approach would be strong in terms of external validity, but implementing it entails substantial practical challenges, and the frequent measurement required might be reactive and therefore problematic with respondents. Consequently, alternatives are a must.
Another approach is laboratory experimentation.
Respondents could receive favorable and unfavorable information about hypothetical candidates, and the effect of each piece of information on attitudes toward the candidates coulud be measured. Although this approach would be strong on internal validity, it is deficient in terms of external validity, because campaigns do not unfold so quickly, and generalizing from the relatively information-limited experimental context to the informationrich environment of real campaigns may be dangerous.
Our approach combined the internal validity advantages of this latter approach with the external validity advantages of the former. Specifically, we analyzed data from surveys in which respondents were asked to list all their favorable and unfavorable beliefs about candidates and that measured attitudes toward those candidates.
This allowed us to compare the attitudes of people with different numbers of favorable and unfavorable beliefs in order to test the hypotheses of the ANM. In addition to testing the positivity offset and negativity bias, we tested one consequence of the primacy effect predicted by the ANM: that as the amount of previous information increases, the marginal utility of each additional piece of information will decrease.
The fact that we relied upon respondents' listings of their favorable and unfavorable beliefs about candidates might seem to imply that we are assuming that formation of attitudes toward candidates occurs in a memorybased fashion, rather than on-line (see Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989 Table 1 ).3 The ANM anticipates that the mean in the (0,0) cell will be greater than 50, reflecting the positivity offset. And indeed, the mean of the 4,272 attitudes in that cell was 56.48, significantly larger than 50 (t(4271) = 20.90, p < .00 1). Also in line with the ANM's notion of decelerating impact, the marginal utility of a favorable or unfavorable belief generally decreased in absolute mag2Pre-election face-to-face interviews with nationally representative samples of American adults were conducted mostly in September and October, and post-election interviews were conducted during the four months after each election. The total sample sizes were 2,705 in 1972, 2,248 in 1976, 1,614 in 1980, 2,257 in 1984, 2,040 in 1988, 2,485 in 1992, and 1,714 in 1996. 3Many respondents contributed two sets of responses to this analysis -one for a Democratic candidate and one for a Republican candidate. Because we obtained similar results when candidates from only one party were analyzed, we report results using data on all the Republican and Democratic candidates at once. nitude as the total number-of beliefs increased. For example, the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed one favorable belief and the attitudes of respondents who listed two favorable beliefs was 7.19, whereas the difference in mean attitudes between respondents who listed four favorable beliefs and those who listed five favorable beliefs was only 2.01 (see the last row of Table 1 ). Similarly, the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed one unfavorable belief and the attitudes of respondents who listed two unfavorable beliefs was 8.50, whereas the difference in mean attitudes between respondents who listed four unfavorable beliefs and those who listed five unfavorable beliefs was only 6.09 (see the last column of Table 1 ).
Among people who listed more than one belief about a candidate, the expected negativity bias appeared.
For example, the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed one favorable belief and those who listed two favorable beliefs was 7.19 (see the second column of the last row in Table 1 ), whereas the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed one unfavorable belief and those who listed two unfavorable beliefs was larger: 8.50 (see the second row of the last column in Table 1 ). And the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed four favorable beliefs and those who listed five favorable beliefs was 2.01 (see the fifth column of the last row in Table 1 ), whereas the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who listed four unfavorable beliefs and those who listed five unfavorable beliefs was again larger:
6.09 (see the fifth row of the last column in Table 1 ). Surprisingly, the negativity bias was not apparent when comparing the impact of a single unfavorable belief with the impact of a single favorable belief. The average difference between the attitudes of respondents who did not list any favorable beliefs and the attitudes of respondents who listed one favorable belief was 22.87 (see the first column of the last row in Table 1 ), whereas the average difference between the attitudes of respondents who did not list any unfavorable beliefs and the attitudes of respondents who listed one unfavorable belief was only 13 .94 (see the last column of the first row in Table 1 ).
Thus, Table 1 offers evidence mostly confirming the ANM, with one conspicuous exception (i.e., the negativity bias did not appear when comparing the impacts of a single favorable belief and a single unfavorable belief).
To generate a benchmark against which to compare the ANM, we estimated the parameters of the SLM in Equation (1) Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the parameter estimates.4 Although the SLM predicts that the intercept for this model will be 50, the intercept is in fact significantly greater than 50 (z = 64.08, p < .001).
Next, we used nonlinear regression to estimate the parameters of Equation (2) to determine if the ANM's hypotheses about the positivity offset, negativity bias, and nonlinearity were supported:5 4To test the robustness of our results, we estimated all the equations reported in this article including variables to control for the year of the election, the candidate, educational attainment, age, race, gender, whether the respondent lived in a rural or urban setting, income, political knowledge, strength of party identification, internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy. The results obtained from these analyses were nearly identical to those reported in the text.
We also estimated the equations reported here including a measure of verbosity (the number of responses to a question asking respondents to list the most important problems facing the country) to control for differences in the tendency to be talkative and therefore to report more likes and/or dislikes. The results obtained from these analyses were nearly identical to those reported in the text. (Marquardt 1963; Press et al. 1992) . We used 1.0 for starting values for all parameters and report the results thusly obtained throughout this article. We also estimated the model using different starting values and obtained identical results.
To gauge the robustness of the parameter estimates produced by nonlinear regression, we conducted OLS regressions predicting attitudes toward candidates using the square root of likes and the square root of dislikes (a transformation that captures the expected nonlinearity) and obtained coefficients that were very similar to those obtained using nonlinear regression. We also estimated Equation (2) using nonlinear regression setting a2 and o4 equal to the coefficients we obtained from this OLS regression. The estimates of I, m, and n from Equation (2) were similar in this analysis to those obtained when all five parameters in Equation (2) were estimated simultaneously (i.e., I was greater than 50, m and n were smaller than 1.0 and greater than 0, and m was larger than n).
In order to test whether the nonlinearity we found was due to ceiling and floor effects, we estimated the SLM and the ANM using the logged odds ratio of the feeling thermometers. When we did so, the parameter estimates of the SLM and ANM were similar to those reported in the text, and the ANM continued to outperform the SLM (ANM: R2 = .40, SLM: R2 =.36; comparison of model fit: F(3,26484) = 530.98, p < .001), suggesting that the nonlinearity we found is not merely the result of floor or ceiling effects. 26,489; F(3,26484) = 814.95, p < .001).6 This comparison is particularly compelling because it is biased against finding a difference between these models, for two reasons. First, the SLM predicts that the intercept for this model would be 50, yet we allowed deviation from 50, which improved apparent fit to the data. Second, the fit of the model to each data point affects this comparison of the models equally. Consequently, the fit of the model in cells of Table 1 the sum of squared differences between each observed cell mean and the mean predicted for each cell by each of the models:
where Aq is the predicted mean attitude for cell q, Oq is the observed mean attitude for cell q, and p is the number of cells in Table 1 . SSerror was 1500.04 for the SLM, more than five times that of the ANM (SSerror = 293.42).
This suggests that the ANM represents a substantial improvement over the SLM.
The intercept of Equation (4) The negativity bias is also apparent, but it is expressed as a difference in the exponents rather than as a difference in the coefficients. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient for favorable beliefs (b = 19.66) is significantly larger in absolute magnitude than the coefficient for unfavorable beliefs (b = 12.27; z = 18.95, p < .001), meaning that a single favorable belief had more impact on attitudes than a single unfavorable belief. However, the exponent for unfavorable beliefs (.61) is significantly larger than the exponent for favorable beliefs (.36; z = 12.50, p < .001), meaning that the marginal utility of unfavorable beliefs decelerated less quickly than that of favorable beliefs.
To explore whether the ANM performs better than the SLM because of the former's asymmetry or its nonlinearity or both, we calculated the parameters for two hybrid models, one constraining (XI to equal (2 in (7) (.08) (.08) (.20) As compared to the R2 of .45 for the SLM, the R2 for Equation (6) (R2 = .49, N = 26,489) is significantly greater (F(2, 26485) = 927.75, p < .001), suggesting that nonlinearity alone significantly improved fit. Although after rounding to two significant digits, the R2 for Equation (7) (R2 = .45, N = 26,489) appears identical to that for the SLM, in fact the former is slightly larger and indeed significantly so (F(1, 26486) = 5.25, p < .05), suggesting that asymmetry alone significantly improved fit as well. Reinforcing these conclusions, the R2 for the ANM, .50, was significantly larger than the R2s for either Equations (6) or (7) (F(1, 26484) = 303.25, p < .00 1; and F(2, 26483) = 1067.75, p < .001 respectively). Furthermore, SSerror for Equations (6) and (7) were 471.08 and 1387.64, respectively, both substantially less than the SSerror for the SLM (1500.04) and substantially more than the SSerror for the ANM (293.42). Thus, both asymmetry and nonlinearity significantly improved fit.
Generalization Across Elections
When we estimated the parameters of the ANM for attitudes toward candidates in each election year separately, the results were quite consistent with those shown in Equation (4) (see the top half of Table 2 ). For each year, the intercept is greater than 50, cc, is greater than the absolute value of ?2, ?(2 is negative, cc, is positive, the exponents are less than 1, and the unfavorable beliefs exponent is larger than the favorable beliefs exponent.
6To compare the R2 of the SLM to that of the ANM, we computed the following test statistic:
, where PSLM and PANM are the number of parameters for the SLM and ANM models, RSSSLM and RSSANM are the residual sums of squares for the SLM and ANM models, and N is the total sample size. This approach is recommended for testing differences between nested nonlinear models (see Bates and Watts 1988; Greene 1990 
Generalization Across Subgroups of Citizens
Much research in psychology has shown that people who are highly involved in a domain form attitudes toward relevant objects differently than people less involved (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1986) . In particular, highly involved people tend to form attitudes through effortful processes, focusing their thinking on the attributes of the objects, whereas low involvement people form their attitudes through simpler processes, less focused on object attributes. One might therefore suspect that the relatively complex process posited by the ANM is most likely to appear among people highly involved in politics. In contrast, less involved citizens might execute simpler integrative processes, perhaps more along the lines of the SLM. On the other hand, the ANM is thought to describe a basic, behaviorally adaptive, and universal process, so it might apply equally well across the range of involvement.
To assess the generalizability of the ANM across subgroups of respondents, we estimated its parameters separately for people high and low in political involvement, As expected, in every group, cc, is positive, (2 is negative, the two exponents are less than one and greater than zero, cc, is greater in absolute magnitude than ?2' the favorable beliefs exponent is smaller than the unfavorable beliefs exponent, and the intercept is greater than 50 (see the top half of Table 3 ). The model. explains less variance in attitudes among respondents who were less politically involved (i.e., nonvoters, late deciders, low knowledge, and low education), presumably reflecting the fact that these individuals derived their attitudes less from the attributes of the objects involved, particularly so among late deciders. Nonetheless, even among these people, the ANM is superior to the SLM in describing the origins of attitudes. 
Attitudes Toward Political Parties
To further explore the generalizability of the ANM, we estimated its parameters predicting attitudes toward the two major political parties using all the National Election Studies providing the necessary data, from 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 
Generalization Across Elections and Subgroups of Respondents
When we estimated the ANM for attitudes toward the parties in each election year separately, the results were quite consistent with those shown in Equation (9) (see the bottom half of Table 2 ). This was also true among respondents high and low in political involvement (see the bottom half of Table 3 ). Again, the model explains less variance in attitudes among respondents who were less politically involved, particularly among late deciders, suggesting that attitudes were based less upon the attributes of the parties.
Documenting the Direction of Causality
Although the results thus far document consistent relations of attitudes with favorable and unfavorable beliefs,
we cannot be sure from this cross-sectional evidence about the causal process(es) that yielded these relations.
Both the SLM and ANM presume that the observed relations reflect the influence of favorable and unfavorable beliefs on attitudes, but it is also possible that attitudes influenced the numbers of favorable and unfavorable beliefs people reported through processes of rationalization (e.g., Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994) . It seems unlikely that people rationalize through as complex a process as that outlined by the ANM, but it is nonetheless possible in principle.
In order to assess more directly whether favorable beliefs and unfavorable beliefs shaped attitudes, we employed a procedure outlined by Kessler and Greenberg (1981; see also Finkel 1995) In doing this analysis, we built upon Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) finding that the more a citizen prefers one candidate over the other, the more likely the citizen is to turn out, presumably because he or she has more to lose if the undesired candidate should win the election.
But we suspected that the impact of attitudes toward candidates might be more complex than described by this hypothesis. A citizen who likes both candidates will presumably be happy no matter which one wins, has little to gain by turning out, and is therefore unlikely to do so, no matter how much he or she prefers one candidate over the other. In contrast, a citizen who likes one candidate and dislikes the other has a lot of incentive to turn out, because he or she will presumably be pleased if the first candidate wins and unhappy if he or she loses.
For this citizen, the election poses a threat, and this threat may lead him or her to act by voting (Miller 2000 Each of these five attitude variables was calculated in three different ways, using respondents' feeling thermometer ratings, and using respondents' favorable and unfavorable beliefs to calculate attitudes using the SLM and the ANM (all attitude measures were coded to range from 0 to 1). If the ANM is a more accurate model of attitude formation, the attitude variables calculated from the favorable and unfavorable beliefs using the ANM should predict turnout better than those calculated from favorable and unfavorable beliefs using the SLM. It is harder to predict, however, how the attitude variables calculated using the ANM will compare to the attitude variables computed using respondents' feeling thermometer ratings. One might expect the attitude variables calculated using respondents' feeling thermometer ratings to predict turnout better than attitudes calculated using either the SLM or ANM, because the feeling thermometer ratings are the most direct measures of attitudes.
However, there may also be substantial measurement error present in the feeling thermometer ratings because different people interpret the feeling thermometer scale points differently (e.g., Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989) , not all the points on the feeling thermometers are labeled (which compromises reliability; see Krosnick and Berent 1993) , and the feeling thermometers offer too many scale points (Krosnick and Fabrigar n.d.) .
When the attitude variables were computed using the feeling thermometers, most control variables in the model had significant effects in the expected directions (see column 1 of Table 4 ). Also, replicating Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) finding, people were more likely to vote the more they preferred one candidate over the other (see the first row in the first column of Table 4 : probit coefficient = .47; z = 2.94, p < .01). Contrary to our expectations, neither of the interactions was statistically significant (see column 1 rows 4 and 5 of Table 4 ). Similar results were obtained when the parameters of Equation (3), the SLM, were used to calculate respondents' attitudes toward the candidates using their reports of favorable and unfavorable beliefs (see column 2 of Table 4 ).
A different story emerged when we used the ANM calculation method shown in Equation (4) instead. For the most part, the results obtained using the ANM (shown in column 3 of Table 4 ) resemble those generated using the SLM. But here, the interaction of the gap between attitudes toward the two candidates with whether or not attitudes toward both candidates were favorable was statistically significant (see the fourth row of the last column of Table 4 : probit coefficient = -1.17, z = 2.05, p < .05). Moreover, the direction of the interaction was consistent with the proposed greater motivational implications of the avoidance of threats. Among people who disliked one or both candidates, a stronger preference for the preferred candidate yielded greater turnout (probit coefficient = 1.02, z = 4.32, p < .001). But among people who liked both candidates, the strength of preference for one candidate over the other had no significant effect on turnout (probit coefficient = -.33, z = .67, n.s.). Thus, the ANM identified a theoretically sensible interaction that the SLM and the feeling thermometers did not. The previously documented predictors of turnout included economic resources (e.g., employment and home ownership), cognitive resources (e.g., education, age, and internal efficacy), social resources (e.g., home ownership and time lived in the community), race, region of residence, involvement in politics (e.g., strength of party identification), and perceptions of the election (e.g., caring about the outcome and the perceived closeness of the major race; Campbell et al. 1960; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Weisberg and Grofman 1981) .
We treated a respondent as having voted if official records indicated that he or she had voted, and we treated a respondent as having not voted if official records did not indicate that he or she voted. Because turnout was only validated for the 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988 NESs, 5,599 respondents were included in these analyses. would introduce a confound in our analyses. In the NES studies we analyzed, 58 percent of the candidate feeling thermometer ratings were above 50, meaning that respondents liked the candidates, whereas only 28 percent were below 50, indicating disliking. Likewise, 56 percent of party feeling thermometer ratings were above 50, and only 25 percent were below 50. McGraw et al.'s (1996) findings therefore imply that the favorable beliefs expressed in these surveys might have been broader on average than the unfavorable beliefs expressed, leading the impact of the former to appear stronger than the apparent impact of the latter.
We therefore set out to conduct an after-the-fact investigation to measure and control for belief breadth in these NES surveys. Our findings show that the single most common method for analyzing the causes of vote choice is seriously mis-specified. In countless studies, investigators have reported additive linear regression equations predicting candidate preferences and estimated the coefficients either with ordinary least squares or probit techniques (e.g., Abelson et al. 1982; Fiorina 1981; Holbrook 1991; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1982; Miller and Shanks 1996) . Such equations do not include the nonlinearities we have documented, nor do they represent the asymmetries we have shown to be operative.
Therefore, it is no surprise that these equations explain far from all the variance in citizens' candidate preferences. Furthermore, the regression coefficients generated by these conventional methods are most likely distorted representations of the impact specific considerations had on vote choices in any given election. Future research should therefore attempt to bridge the gap between our findings and the typical analytic approach implemented in most studies of elections.
Testing Primacy
To test the primacy effect predicted by the ANM, we assessed whether the marginal utility of information declined as the amount of previous information of the same type increased. Our findings in this regard are consistent with a primacy effect, but the decreased marginal utility we observed is also consistent with a very different hypothesis: acquiring new information may have reduced the impact of previously acquired information on attitudes, which would constitute a recency effect that would also yield decreasing marginal utility. Previous studies of attitude formation provide strong evidence of primacy effects in attitude formation (Anderson 1965b) , lending credence to our belief that the decreasing marginal utility we observed is the result of primacy. But to test these two competing accounts, we would need to gauge the effect of each favorable and unfavorable belief after it is acquired. This would be practically impossible in a field study, but it could be done in a complex laboratory experiment, and we look forward to seeing such evidence in the future.
Other Tests of the Negativity Bias and the Positivity Offset Klein (1991 Klein ( , 1996 also purportedly tested for a negativity bias by examining respondent ratings of how well each of a series of favorable personality trait terms described candidates, on a scale ranging from "not well at all" to "extremely well." Traits on which a candidate was rated below the mean of all the trait ratings were considered "negative" traits, and Klein compared the impact of "negative" traits with the impact of other traits on attitudes toward candidates. This measure of negativity is problematic because low ratings could simply have reflected the absence of a positive trait rather than the presence of a negative one. Thus, our research is the first in which positivity and negativity have been properly gauged, and we found a more complex negativity effect than Lau (1982) or Klein (1991 Klein ( , 1996 uncovered.
A study by Lau and Sears (1979) , showing that people are generally inclined to evaluate politicians favorably, might at first appear to offer confirmation of the positivity offset hypothesis. However, the positivity offset hypothesis refers specifically to situations in which a perceiver has no information at all about a target. Lau and Sears (1979) focused on evaluations of politicians about whom respondents had a great deal of information, so their study did not test the positivity offset. Thus, our evidence is the first of relevance on this matter as well.
Convergence with Other Evidence
Confidence in our findings is enhanced by their convergence with recent evidence generated using a very different method. Taber and Steenbergen (1995) when we obtained Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning's (1994) data and reanalyzed them, we found evidence of substantial and reliable derivation when we examined attitudes toward each of the two gubernatorial candidates individually (in line with the present paper's analytic approach), rather than combining the two candidates in a single analysis predicting choice between them (as Rahn, Krosnick, and Breuning 1994, had done) . Therefore, although rationalization of attitudes with beliefs appears to be quite a real phenomenon, derivation of attitudes from beliefs occurs as well.
The Impact of Negative Campaigning
It is interesting to note that evidence of a negativity bias appeared in our analyses of the NES data despite a confound operating to suppress the negativity effect, involving the order in which candidates typically provide favorable and unfavorable information to citizens during a campaign. Most often, campaigns begin with candidates positively building their own credibility and offering solutions to problems, whereas campaigns typically end with candidates attacking their opponents (Devlin 1989; Greenblatt 1998; Hagstrom and Guskind 1986 
Nuance in the Turnout Calculus
The ANM uncovered evidence of nuance in decisions about whether to turn out to vote that was not apparent with the SLM's portrayal of attitudes. Specifically, it appears that people who disliked at least one of the candidates were more motivated to turn out as the strength of their preferences for one candidate over the other increased. These were people who had something to lose by an undesirable outcome, and the more substantial these potential losses, the more motivated these people were to turn out. In contrast, among people who had only something to gain (i.e., because they liked both candidates), stronger preference for one candidate over the other did not motivate increased turnout. Not only does this finding reinforce confidence in the ANM, but it also adds to our understanding of the processes by which turnout decisions are made, suggesting a more nuanced process driven by perceived threats. and 1996 (b = -.0004, S.E. =.002, p < .01), which Table 4 suggests would yield declining turnout. That is, these people may be less likely to vote now because their attitudes toward the competitors are more similar than those attitudes were years ago.
Failure of the Feeling Thermometers
Whereas the ANM revealed the nuanced effect of attitudes on turnout, the feeling thermometers did not. This is probably because of substantial measurement error present in the feeling thermometer ratings. Different people interpret the feeling-thermometer scale differently, creating systematic measurement error (e.g., Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989) , and substantial ran- can political attitudes and behavior over these years that suggest decreasing positivity toward these political agents (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Teixeira 1992; Wattenberg, 1984) , the decrease in the positivity offset is to be expected. Given the increasing negativity towards politicians and politics in general, it is striking that we find the positivity offset at all in recent elections.
Conclusion
Although simple models of political attitude formation are appealing because of their parsimony, our research demonstrates that the complexity of the ANM adds to our understanding of and our ability to predict attitudes toward both individual political actors and parties. The Indeed, any analysis of political attitude formation is likely to benefit from consideration of the issues raised here and the processes our analyses documented.
Whether one is interested in the preferences of a Secretary of State or of a guerilla terrorist or of an autocratic dictator, understanding processes of attitude formation and change and the behavioral consequences of attitudes will most likely be greater if we recognize initial optimism, asymmetry, and nonlinearity. Thus, it appears, the psychological processes governing political evaluation are not so "simple" (Kelley and Mirer 1974) after all.
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